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Abstract
We study the importance of social interactions on the occupational choice in
Victorian London using a multinomial choice model within an incomplete social
network. Individuals form heterogeneous rational expectations about their peers’
behaviors taking into account their characteristics and the strength of their ties.
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We show the conditions under which the endogenous, exogenous and correlated
effects can be identified and a unique equilibrium can be established. Using a
novel dataset, we proxy social groups by parish boundaries and strength of ties
by geographic distances. Our results show the importance of the endogenous
effects and reveal distinct effects by occupation.
JEL codes: C25, C31, J24, N93
1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that individuals are embedded in social networks that influence
their behaviors and outcomes. Empirical analyses of social network effects have to face
conceptual and data challenges. The structure and composition of an individual’s social
network are hard to measure. Analyses are further complicated by self-selection which can
lead to a serious bias in the estimation of peer effect. In this paper, we study the importance
of social interactions on the occupational choice of individuals in Victorian London. We
address both empirical and theoretical issues using a novel dataset and a structural model
approach.
We present a multinomial choice model with heterogeneous beliefs. In our model, in-
dividuals belong to a social group and interact with its members. When deciding their
occupation, individuals form rational expectations about their peers’ behavior taking into
account their characteristics. Heterogeneity in these expectations are introduced through a
weighting matrix which captures the strength of ties between peers. Correlated effects at
the group level are included to capture potential shocks hitting the group as a whole. We
show that the asymmetry in the influence of one’s peers through the weighting matrix allows
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us to separately identify the endogenous effect (the influence of peers’ behavior) and the ex-
ogenous effect (the influence of peers’ attributes) from group unobservables. The conditions
for unique equilibrium are also established. This framework may be applied to many areas
involving local interactions and categorical outcomes such as criminal activities, modes of
transport, or technology adoption. The structural parameters are estimated using a Recur-
sive Pseudo Maximum Likelihood with an equilibrium fixed point subroutine following the
Relaxation Method proposed by Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) and Kasahara and Shimotsu
(2018).
We then apply it to individuals’ occupational choice in Victorian London. Combining a
geo-referenced historical map of London with the full census of 1881, we construct a new
dataset which allows us to locate individuals down to the street level. By exploiting the
unique features of our historical setting and detailed dataset we overcome common empir-
ical challenges. First, determining the appropriate reference group is difficult, especially
in the modern world of high mobility and easy access to communication technologies. Re-
searchers usually proxy the relevant group using some arbitrary metric of distance based on
social and/or geographical proximity. Using a poor proxy for the true social group induces
complicated patterns of interdependencies in errors across individuals. We present a novel
definition of social group based on ecclesiastical parish boundaries. Parish membership was
based on residency at a time when social networks were mostly local in nature and religion
played a central role in community life (Booth, 1897). Consequently, ecclesiastical parish
boundaries have the advantage of providing us with a more credible proxy for social groups.
Second, computerization and the use of internet have been shown to play an important role
in job search. Our historical setting suffers no such contamination in the role of informal
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contacts. Third, the fine spatial resolution of our data allows us to measure the strength
of ties between parish members using geographical distances. Finally, the main threat to
identification when examining peer effects is the sorting of individuals into social groups. We
exploit the fact that London was operating under a two-tier administrative system. Parishes
were grouped together to form local Board of Works (BW) or Vestries that were in charge
of public good provision. By adding a fixed effect at the BW/Vestry level, we partly control
for self-selection into groups.1 We also include parish–level fixed effects to control for the
possible confounding factors in the form of local industry shocks or a local priest who might
encourage parishioners to share information.
Our results highlight the importance of social networks on occupational choice. There is
a positive effect in the expected share of peers within a social group employed in a certain
occupation on an individual’s choice to follow the same occupation, regardless of the type of
occupation. This reflects local complementarities stemming from learning spillovers, aspira-
tion formation, or social capital. Indeed, peers can shape the beliefs of other parish members
by sharing information about job opportunities or by sharing their experience about a par-
1 In the absence of random peer groups, most studies incorporate group–specific fixed
effect and/or group random effects to account for correlated effects. These studies justify
this strategy by arguing that individual choices cannot narrow their preferences down to the
smaller preferred unit. In the case of class-school choice, families can decide which school to
send their children to but cannot decide which class they will be part of. In our context, we
argue that families decide where to live based on the amenities provided at the BW/Vestry
level and cannot choose their exact locations due to the tight housing market. Nevertheless,
it is important to acknowledge that our approach does not allow for non-random selection
of individuals into groups.
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ticular occupation which affects aspiration. Alternatively, social capital can affect beliefs
through social norms and/or peer pressure. Moreover, we uncover a large variation in the
size of these endogenous effects depending on the type of occupation. A one standard devia-
tion increase in the expected share of peers leads to an increase in the likelihood of choosing
the same occupation ranging from 3.7% in the case of industrial artisan to a mere 0.44% in
the case of professional occupation. This stark difference might be explained by the fact that
the relevant peers for professionals operate at a higher level than the parish. More generally,
we show that the endogenous effects are more precisely estimated under heterogeneous ratio-
nal expectations than under the homogeneous case. Moreover, ignoring possible unobserved
shocks at the group level might bias peer effect estimates.
Our results remain robust to alternative explanations, specifications, and estimator re-
finements. We provide evidence that our results are robust to the sorting of individuals into
streets within parish. We also control for the influence of family members by creating a
new dataset that tracks individuals from the 1851 to the 1881 census thus allowing us to
identify the occupation of fathers and brothers. Further robustness checks include specifica-
tions looking at the age of individuals and alternative measures of strength of ties. Finally,
a bias-correction estimation is implemented to account for fixed-effects in nonlinear models.
Assessing whether and to what extent social interactions influence occupational choice
is important given the role of occupational structure in the process of development through
the distribution of income and wealth (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). Our results yield
a number of insights. Social networks can offer a possible explanation for the observed
spatial clustering of occupation (Bayer et al., 2008) and the inequality patterns within a city
(Glaeser et al., 2009). Moreover, the composition of social reference groups may produce a
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misallocation of talent and resources since contacts can help find job but not necessarily in
the occupation where workers are most productive. Our findings therefore brings support
to the view that social groups can be a determinant of cross country GDP and productivity
differences (Murphy et al., 1991). Finally, our results provide a novel interpretation for the
observed low intergenerational mobility and persistence of segregation by occupation (Solon,
1999). Intergenerational mobility may remain low because workers seek to use their inherited
social connections to find jobs more easily (Borjas, 1994).
The model we propose builds on a growing number of theoretical models incorporating
social interactions. In a seminal paper, Manski (1993) proposes a linear–in–means model
with social interactions within a complete network. Individuals belong to a group, interact
with all the other members within the group, and form rational expectations regarding their
peers’ behavior. Consequently, individuals are equally influenced by all members of their
own group and form homogeneous rational expectations based on the group–level behavior.
Blume et al. (2015) generalize this results to linear social interactions models where the
actions have a continuous support. The homogeneous rational expectation framework is
adopted by Brock and Durlauf (2001) in a binary choice model and Brock and Durlauf
(2002, 2006) in a multinomial choice model. In the case of an incomplete network where
individuals weigh their interactions by the strength of their ties, individuals may take into
account their peers’ characteristics thereby forming heterogeneous rational expectations. We
provide such an extension and show that the conditions for a unique equilibrium are not more
stringent than in the case of homogeneous expectations. Moreover, we find that, even in the
presence of correlated effects, the endogenous parameters are identified for all the alternatives
if there is sufficient variation in the network within group. Another closely related paper is
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Lee et al. (2014) which develops a heterogeneous rational expectations within a binary choice
model. Not only do we focus on a multinomial choice model, but our empirical application
and estimation strategy also differ from theirs.
Our paper also contributes to the empirical literature that focuses on the role of social
networks for labor market outcomes. There is considerable evidence that social contacts are
important for labor market outcomes (Ioannides and Loury, 2004). Most of the literature
has assessed the role of social contacts on employment status, unemployment duration and
wages. The part of this literature which is closely related to ours emphasizes network ef-
fects as neighborhood or ethnic group effects. The evidence suggests that networks defined
by geographical proximity have a positive influence on employment. Bayer et al. (2008)
use micro-level census data for Boston and find that residing in the same block raises the
probability of sharing the work location by 33%, consistent with local referral effects. These
neighborhood effects are particularly strong in the case of ethnic groups. Patacchini and
Zenou (2012) focus on ethnic minorities in England and find that the higher the percentage
of a given ethnic group living nearby, the higher the probability of finding a job through social
contacts. Neighborhood effects however have for the most part ignored the micro-structure
of connections due to data limitation. Thanks to our historical setting and unique dataset,
we define social groups using religious and political borders and proxy for the strength of
ties between individuals using geographical proximity.
The network literature on occupational choice is relatively scant. Munshi (2003) explores
the influence of the occupational choice of nineteenth century immigrants on those of current
immigrants from the same country through transmission of job information. He finds that
community-based social interactions improve labor market outcomes among migrants. Patel
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and Vella (2013) find that new immigrants are more likely to choose the same occupation
previous immigrants from the same country have chosen and enjoy a large and positive effect
on their earnings. Most studies introducing spillovers from social networks into occupational
choice take them as exogenous. For instance, in Cicala et al. (2017), exogenous spillovers
change relative benefits from different activities. Albornoz et al. (2017) introduce endogenous
spillovers where individuals choose whom to interact with and then choose the strength of
their ties and productive efforts. To this body of work we add by systematically measuring
the magnitude of endogenous spillovers by occupation category.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the multinomial choice
model and identification results. Section 3 shows the estimation strategy. We apply our
model in section 4 to occupational choices in nineteenth century London. We present our
results on the influence of peers on occupational choice and explore alternative explanations.
We finally perform several robustness checks. In section 5 we conclude.
2 Empirical Model
Consider individual i embedded in a group g faced with a multinomial choice y ∈ Y =
{0, 1, . . . , L− 1}. There are G groups in the population, each g ∈ G is characterized by a
realization ng of the random variable determining the size of the group. A row-normalized
weighting matrix Wg (also known as an adjacency matrix), with entry wg,ij∀i, j ∈ g, repre-
sents the strength of the tie between i and j. We assume no self–influence (i.e. wg,ii = 0).
The 1 × ng vector wg,i determines the weight individual i, belonging to group g, places on
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each member of her group.2
Individual i is characterized by a vector xg,i (dim(xg,i) = K). Taking group membership
as given, i chooses outcome y ∈ Y such as to maximize a pay–off function V : Y → R, within
a random utility maximization framework (McFadden, 1974). The individual utility consists
of four components: a deterministic private utility u(·), a “social” utility S(·) that depends
on group characteristics and outcomes, a group–level effect νg,y, and a random private utility
εg,y,i (Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007).
max
y∈Y
u(y,xg,i) + S
(
y,Xg,p
e,i
gy ,Wg
)
+ νg,y + εg,y,i, (1)
where Xg is the ng ×K matrix with ith-row equal to xg,i. νg,y and εg,y,i are unobservable to
the econometrician. Let Ii = (Wg,Xg, νg,y∀y ∈ Y , εg,y,i∀y ∈ Y) denote the amount of infor-
mation available to individual i ∈ g before choosing. Let pe,igy,j be the belief that individual
i ∈ g has about individual j ∈ g taking action y ∈ Y and pe,igy ≡
(
pe,igy,j∀j ∈ g
)
. Note that
such a belief has superscript i because it potentially depends on (εg,y,i∀y ∈ Y). We assume:
A0.a. Incomplete information and rational expectations: Individual i ∈ g forms rational
expectations regarding the behavior of members of her group. That is, pe,igy,j coincides with
the objective belief for each j ∈ g, denoted by pigy,j.
A0.b. Linearity of private and social utilities:
(i) u(y,xg,i) = αy + xg,iβy;
2 With some abuse of notation, g is used as the social group index and the set of all
individuals belonging to that group, and G is used to denote the total number of groups and
the collection of groups.
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(ii) S
(
y,Xg,p
e,i
gy ,Wg
)
= wg,iXgδy + wg,ip
e,i
gyγy.
A0.c. Distribution of private utility shocks:
(i) εg,y,i are independent and identically distributed across and within groups g with known
Gumbel distribution function Fε(εg,y,i < ε) = exp(− exp(−ε)). Hence, pigy,j can be
denoted by pgy,j.
3
(ii) (εg,y,i ∀y ∈ Y , ∀i ∈ g) ⊥ (xg,i ∀i ∈ g,Wg, νg,y∀y ∈ Y) .
Notice assumption A0.c.ii requires that (εg,y,i ∀y ∈ Y , ∀i ∈ g)⊥Wg which suggests that,
once we account for group fixed effects, there are no unobservables among peers that explain
whom they would like to interact with. Imposing assumptions A0, one can derive from
expression (1) that agent i, belonging to social group g, chooses y with probability given by
pgy,i =
exp(αy+xg,iβy+wg,iXgδy+wg,ipgyγy+νg,y)∑
y′∈Y
exp(αy′+xg,iβy′+wg,iXgδy′+wg,ipgy′γy′+νg,y′)
. (2)
In Manski (1993)’s terms, we wish to know whether we see correlations among peers be-
cause they share the same sources of information νg,y (correlated effect), because they share
individual characteristics as a result of self-selection δy (contextual or exogenous effect), or
because they learn from one another’s behavior γy (endogenous effect).
2.1 Equilibrium
Individuals maximize expected utility and each one has consistent beliefs about the choices
of other parish members given by vector pgy. Therefore, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium to the
individual choice vector pgy is the fixed point solution to expression
3 By mutual independence of taste shocks, pigy,j is independent of (εg,y,i∀y ∈ Y).
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pgy ≡

pgy,1
...
pgy,ng

=

exp(αy+xg,1βy+wg,1Xgδy+wg,1pgyγy+νg,y)∑
y′∈Y
exp(αy′+xg,1βy′+wg,1Xgδy′+wg,1pgy′γy′+νg,y′)
...
exp(αy+xg,ngβy+wg,ngXgδy+wg,ngpgyγy+νg,y)∑
y′∈Y
exp(αy′+xg,ngβy′+wg,ngXgδy′+wg,ngpgy′γy′+νg,y′)

. (3)
If we collect the L-left hand side vectors from expression (3), we get the ng × L ma-
trix Pg = (pg0, . . . ,pgL−1). Denoting the right hand side as Ψ(·) we get, where θ =(
αy,βy, δy, γy, (νg,y)g∈G
)
y∈Y
,
Pg = Ψ(Pg,Xg,Wg;θ). (4)
Contrary to linear models of social interactions, our framework exhibits multiple equilibria
as the structure is compatible with more than one aggregate outcome.4 Proposition 1 shows
that the more alternatives individuals face, the less likely multiple equilibria are. This is due
to the independence of errors which implies that with more alternatives, the non–linearities
in the fixed point condition become less pronounced, thus enlarging the set of values of γy
for which a unique equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1. Multiplicity. In the multinomial choice model with asymmetric influence
and network interactions given by (1) and (4), assuming γy = γ, δy = δ, βy = β, αy =
α, νg,y = νg for all y ∈ Y, if γ < 4
(
1− 1
L
)
then there is a unique equilibrium.
4 The existence of equilibria follows from A0, which guarantees that the probability of
choosing y is a continuous function bounded by the unit interval, and the application of the
Brouwer’s fixed theorem (Brock and Durlauf, 2006), as in the standard multinomial logit
case.
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This result is a direct extension to Lee et al. (2014)’s condition for the binary case
within an heterogeneous expectations setup (see proof in the Appendix A).5 Incorporating
heterogeneous expectations does not impose more stringent sufficient conditions than the
homogeneous one (Brock and Durlauf, 2006).
Due to this multiplicity, we assume that for any given parish, given primitives (Wg,θ),
the data observed by the econometrician is generated from one of the possible equilibria.
A unique equilibrium in data condition is common in the literature estimating games with
incomplete information using a homogeneous sample of subjects or with spatially similar
markets.6 It is worth highlighting that a unique equilibrium is a sufficient condition for our
identification result, detailed in the next section, where we assume that pg,y is observed by
the econometrician.
2.2 Identification
There are three main threats to the identification of the parameters θ. First, in most cases,
individuals sort into groups non-randomly. Individuals choose which group they would like to
belong to and with whom they would like to interact. If the variables that drive this process
of selection are not fully observable, the resulting correlation in unobservables among peers
can lead to serious bias in the estimation of social interaction. This self–selection problem
5 Notice that when L = 2 our econometric specification would be equivalent to Lee et
al.’s equation (5), with ρ as the endogenous effect. On page 406 of Lee et al.’s paper, the
authors state that |ρ| < 2 is a sufficient condition for unique equilibrium, which would be
equivalent to ours after substituting L = 2 on right hand side of the γ inequality.
6 See De Paula (2013) for a recent discussion on identification and estimation of such
multiple equilibria games.
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can be dealt with by operating under random assignment within and across groups based
on observables along with group–fixed effects.7 We use the model specification which has
a group–specific component of the error term, and adopt a traditional (pseudo) panel data
fixed–effects estimator.
Second, the presence of correlated effects, due to common unobserved information shocks
that hit the group as a whole, prevents the separate identification of the exogenous from
the endogenous effects in the linear–in–means framework with symmetric influence (Manski,
1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Blume et al., 2010). We show below that even in the presence
of correlated effects, it is possible to separately identify the endogenous from the exogenous
effects.
Finally, when studying a linear–in–means model, the identification is further complicated
by the simultaneity problem, also known as the reflection problem (Manski, 1993). In such
models individuals interact in groups, that is individuals are affected by all others in their
group and by none outside the group. As a consequence, everyone’s behavior affects the
others linearly which makes it impossible to separately identify if a group member’s action is
the cause or the effect of peer’s influence. However, the non–linear functional form from the
7 Assume that agents self–select into different groups in the first step, and that link
formation takes place within groups in the second step. Then, as Bramoullé et al. (2009)
observe in their conclusion, if link formation is uncorrelated with the observable variables,
this two-step model of link formation generates group-fixed effects. This approach is used
Lin (2010) with its limitation acknowledged in their footnote 10. Alternative approaches
include explicitly correcting for selection (Lee, 1983), imposing exclusion restrictions on the
structural model (Graham and Hahn, 2005) or introducing variance restrictions on the error
terms that are independent to the group size (Graham, 2008).
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discrete choice model breaks this simultaneity problem (Brock and Durlauf, 2001, 2006).8
Proposition 2. Under L > 2, A.0 and the following assumptions:
A.1 Joint support of (xg,i,wg,iXg) is not contained in any linear proper subspace of R2K.
A.2 The support of wg,iXg is not contained in any linear proper subspace of RK.
A.3 There is a group g such that conditional on WgXg, the support of xg,i is not contained
in any proper linear subspace of RK.
A.4 There is at least an element k in xg,i, with δy,k 6= 0∀y ∈ Y, that does not have bounded
support.
A.5 For each y, across different groups, pg,y and νg,y are not constant.
A.6 There is a group g with at least a pair i, j ∈ g, i 6= j, such that wg,ipgy 6= wg,jpgy.
Then, for model described by (1)-(3), the true set of parameters θ \ (γy)y∈Y are identified
relative to a specific alternative, y = 0, while all (γy)y∈Y are identified.
Assumption A.0 guarantees the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is given by equation 4. As-
sumptions A.1-A.3 rule out collinearity between regressors, and assumption A.4 is needed to
guarantee that exogenous effects interacted with their corresponding covariates are bounded
away from the unit interval which rational expectations belong to. Assumption A.5 imposes
8 For instance, in the case of symmetric influence multinomial without group unobserv-
ables, Blume et al. (2010)’s Theorem 13 provides sufficient conditions for the identification
of θ up to a normalization on one of the alternatives.
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sufficient between–group variation on expected choices and correlated effects.9 A.6 requires
sufficient within–group variation such that, in at least one group, weighted expected beliefs
about other group members should be different for at least two individuals within the group.
If these assumptions hold, all endogenous effects are identified and the other structural pa-
rameters are identified relative to a specific alternative, even in the presence of correlated
effects.
This result is related to the literature that exploits the structure of the weighting matrix
(Bramoullé et al., 2009) or group size variations (Lee, 2007) for the identification within a
linear–in–means model. We note however, that given the non–linearities at the core of the
discrete choice model, the requirement on the structure of the network is weaker than for the
continuous case (Bramoullé, 2013). Our result also extends the proof in Brock and Durlauf
(2006) that endogenous effects were identified only relative to any distinct alternative.
3 Estimation Procedure and Simulation
Define the pseudo log-likelihood function
LN(Y | X,W ,P ;θ) =
1
N
∑
g∈G
∑
i∈g
log

∑
y∈Y
(
exp (αy + xg,iβy + wg,iXgδy + wg,ipgyγy + νg,y)1[yg,i=y]
)
∑
y′∈Y
exp (αy′ + xg,iβy′ + wg,iXgδy′ + wg,ipgy′γy′ + νg,y′)

(5)
9 Together with the unique equilibrium in data condition, A.5 means that for a given
realization of Xg, Wg and νg only one Pg should be observed in the data. As we assume
that νg is not constant across g ∈ G, even for two groups g, g′ ∈ G, g 6= g′ such that Xg = Xg′
and Wg = Wg′ we still get that Pg 6= Pg′ , and, therefore, the identification result would
still hold when all covariates are discrete.
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where N =
∑
g∈G
ng and yg,i is the occupation chosen by individual i ∈ g. X ≡ (Xg∀g ∈ G)
denotes the exogenous observables, W ≡ (Wg∀g ∈ G) represents the observed weighting
matrix, and P is the collection of Pgy∀g, y.
Estimating the full maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of our discrete choice problem
with social interacions is computationally costly because it is required to repeatedly solve
the fixed point of P = Ψ(P,X,W ; θ) at each candidate parameter value. Consequently
various alternative estimation procedures have been proposed in the literature. We follow
Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012, 2018)’s Relaxation Method of the Nested Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (NPL-Λ algorithm) estimation procedure. Let P̂0 ≡
(
p̂0gy
)
g∈G,y∈Y be an initial
guess of P. Starting from P̂0, the NPL-Λ algorithm iterates the following steps until t = T :
Outer loop: Given P̂t−1, update θ by θ̂t = arg max
θ∈Θ
LN(Y | X,W , P̂t−1;θ)
Inner loop: Given θ̂t, P̂t solves for the fixed point of P = Λ
(
P, θ̂t
)
≡ Ψ
(
P,X,W; θ̂t
)φ
P1−φ
with φ ≈ 0.
In the outer loop, we obtain θ̂t by maximising the pseudo likelihood function using a Newton–
Raphson algorithm. We then solve the fixed point by iterating Pj = Λ
(
Pj−1, θ̂t
)
until
‖Pj −Pj−1‖ is smaller than a predetermined stopping criterion.10 This algorithm generates
a sequence of estimators
{
θ̂t, P̂t
}
t=1,...,T
. The estimates at t = T are chosen as the NPL-Λ
estimator, which we denote as θ̂.11
10 Bisin et al. (2011) advice implementing such recursive method for T = 2 iterations.
Following Kasahara and Shimotsu (2018), we fix the tolerance level at 10−8 and iterate until
T = 50. Our main results are based on φ = 0.1. We also estimated with φ = 0.8 and results
do not change significantly.
11 Lee et al. (2014) use a fixed point convergence in their estimation. They substitute
the fixed point updating step with P̂t being the solution to the fixed point iteration P =
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The algorithm produces an estimate which converges in probability to the true parameter
vector even when the fixed point constraint (4) does not have local contraction properties
in a neighborhood of the true parameters. When there is no unobserved heterogeneity or
correlated effects, Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) show in Proposition 5 that even when the
belief mapping doesn’t satisfy a good contraction property, the NPL-Λ algorithm converges
to a consistent estimator provided there is an appropriate value of φ (i.e., one that minimizes
the spectral radius of Λ(P, θ0)) and a large number of agents.12 Given our Proposition 1,
the contraction property around our true parameters is not guaranteed. This recursive
method can be applied to a wide class of dynamic programming models and can account for
unobserved heterogeneity.13
Allowing for correlated effects at the group level νg,y induces an incidental parameters
problem which might lead to the inconsistency of maximum likelihood estimators (Neyman
and Scott, 1948). This arises from the fact that information about the group fixed–effects
Ψ(P,X,W; θ̂t).
12 The large sample properties of the NPL estimator are proven by Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007) in their Proposition 2.
13 It is worth noting that there are links to the literature on one-to-one two-sided matching
with unobserved heterogeneity. Graham (2013) shows that the equilibrium representation
of matches in this model corresponds to the fixed point of a system of nonlinear equations.
Mourifié and Siow (2014) introduces peer effects in two-sided matching models and relate it to
a multinomial choice with peer effects. In our model, the equilibrium expected occupational
choice is also characterized by a fixed point condition which features, as in the one-to-one
two-sided matching decision, interdependence between individual actions and (group-level)
unobserved heterogeneity.
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stops accumulating after a finite number of observations as is the case in small groups.14 In
contrast, our application features many groups of large size which allows us to pursue a fixed–
effect estimation and circumvent potential specification errors which might arise when using
a random-effect approach to modelling unobserved heterogeneity (Dhaene and Jochmans,
2015).15 In the presence of correlated effects, the requirement for consistency under the
NPL-Λ algorithm is that the number of groups and their size go to infinity (Kasahara and
Shimotsu, 2012). This is a limitation in some applications with sample data. Gautam
(2020) discusses a two-step method for bias reduction in estimation parameters when there
is classical measurement error due to sampling within groups.
14 In a binary choice network model with small groups, the implementation of group
fixed–effects is not feasible as it introduces too many fixed–effect parameters to estimate.
This is the case in Lee et al. (2014)’s application and they instead follow a random-effect
estimation model. Another possible strategy is a conditional maximum likelihood function
that differences out the group fixed effects (Andersen, 1970). This approach produces a
likelihood function that is not affected by the incidental parameter bias and the estimator
converges to the true parameter as the number of groups increases even if they are of small
size (Chamberlain, 1980). However, it does not deliver estimates of the fixed effects which
are important to recover partial effects (Stammann et al., 2016). Additionally, it does not
retain its computational advantage for large-N and large-T.
15 In Appendix H we perform a Montecarlo simulation to investigate how acute the inci-
dental parameters problem may be for the NPL-Λ algorithm. The results indicate that the
larger the number of groups, the larger their size, the closer the our estimates are to the true
parameters and the smaller is the dispersion.
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4 Empirical Application
4.1 Historical Background
Ancient parishes find their origin in the manorial system and remained largely an eccle-
siastical unit. Until the seventeenth century, the manor was the principal unit of local
administration and justice. However, in due course, parish boundaries came to matter a lot
to residents as parishes became public good providers with the “Poor Law” in 1601 giving
parish officials the legal ability to collect money from rate payers to spend on poor relief for
the sick, elderly and infirm - the “deserving” poor. The Metropolis Management Act of 1855
was a landmark in the history of London’s government. This Act established the Metropoli-
tan Board of Works and empowered it to develop and implement schemes of London-wide
significance. It also created local Board of Works (BW) and Vestries, which were groupings
of smaller parishes, with statutory powers to manage and improve local facilities such as
paving, lighting, and sewerage. The boundaries of the ecclesiastical parishes remained unal-
tered and so was their religious functions. The Compulsory Church Rate Abolition Act of
1868 finally removed the power of ecclesiastical parishes to collect compulsory church rate,
from which time they became almost irrelevant as a unit of government. Furthermore, by
giving rise to a national system of state education, the Education Act of 1870 relieved part
of the education role which was previously under the control of the established church.
Despite losing importance in terms of civic responsibilities, ecclesiastical parishes re-
mained an integral part of community life. By the end of the nineteenth century Booth
(1897) stated “(...) there are other social influences which form part of the very structure
of life (...) Among these influences Religion claims the chief part”. Such account is cor-
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roborated by contemporaneous authors who claim that by the beginning of the nineteenth
century “religion was both more pervasive and more central than anything we know in to-
day’s Western world” (Friedman, 2011). Church attendance was not only mandatory but
also important to maintain standing within the community. Church and chapel attendance
did not fall between 1851 and 1881, and in absolute terms actually grew up to around 1906,
though it fell relative to the population (Smith, 1904). In the only reliable Religious Census
collected between 1902–1903, 47% of the population in Greater London that could attend a
place of worship at least once on a Sunday actually attended. Parish membership was also
important as it determined burial, inclusion in the intentions of the Missa pro populo, right
to have one’s marriage solemnized, etc.
The institutional layout of Victorian London means that both ecclesiastical parishes and
BW/Vestries mattered for Londoners. Ecclesiastical parish were important for socialization
and would have been a relevant source of information, mentorship, role model and aspira-
tion. Local communities were also relevant sources of job opportunities. Given that parish
membership was determined by domicile, we use the ecclesiastical parish boundaries as prox-
ies for social communities. In addition to the religion aspect, this definition of social group
also captures the fact that social interactions were very local in nature in late nineteenth
century London. The distances over which most people travelled to work remained relatively
short. The mean journey to work for those employed in London was only around 5 km in
the nineteenth century (Warnes, 1972). We use the spatial distance between individuals as
a proxy for the strength of their ties.
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4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We combine the 100% sample of England and Wales census of 1881 (Schürer and Woollard,
2003) from the North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP, 2015) and digitized historical map
of London. The census contains the full address of individuals. In addition to geographic
variables, the census also provides a wide range of socio-demographic information. There are
over 400 self–reported occupations which we aggregate into three categories: professional,
commercial, and industrial (Woollard, 1998).16 Using historical maps, we geo-reference 5,998
streets of London using points in the middle of each street and overlay ecclesiastical parish
and BW/Vestry boundaries. We geographically locate 70% of the entire population in Lon-
don in the census on the historical map using their place of residence (address, parish and
county).
Our sample focuses on native men of working age (between the ages of 15 and 60) who
were household heads.17 This is to ensure that individuals are aware of the institutional
16 Professional workers include civil service, clerical, legal professions, medical profes-
sions, education, liberal arts, scientists and sports. Commercial workers include sales, mer-
chants, dealers of money, and drivers. Industrial workers are further divided into artisan,
builder, food/agriculture and services. Industrial food/agriculture include agriculture and
food dealers. Workers in industrial services work in service, sales, media and technical sec-
tors. Occupations are broadly defined such that they are not perfect substitutes. There are
also domestic occupations and unemployed categories, each representing less than 6% of the
male population. We do not include this population in the analysis. This is motivated by the
fact that people working in domestic occupations generally live were they work, invalidating
our measure of strength of ties.
17 We remove from our sample foreign-born individuals and individuals who lived in the
place where they worked (e.g. prisons, workhouses or other public institutions). Land-owners
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layout of London and are integrated in a social group. We also restrict ourselves, to avoid
small sample issues, to individuals living in parishes for which: the BW/Vestry is composed
of at least two ecclesiastical parishes, with at least 30 residents, and with at least one neighbor
living on the same street. We end up with a total of 128, 709 individuals distributed over
186 ecclesiastical parishes within 32 BW/Vestry. There are on average 5.81 ecclesiastical
parishes per BW/Vestry and 692 parishioners per parish. Parish residents have on average
150 neighbors living within 50 meters in the same parish.18
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. The mean age was 38. The
majority of individuals were married with an average of two children. The average number
of servants, which has been used as a proxy for wealth, was 0.175 with a large variation within
the sample. Finally 14% of individuals lived in their parish of birth while 47% lived in their
county of birth. Figures D.2 and D.3 in the Appendix map these various characteristics
and present the spatial clustering of occupations. Professional trades accounted for a large
proportion of West London. In contrast, commercial occupations were concentrated in East
London. Finally, industrial workers appeared to be more spread out across London.
or factory owners often built houses for their workers. We therefore also remove individuals
who live at the same address, perform the same job and are not family related.
18 Figures D.1 and Table D.2 illustrate descriptives of our sample by ecclesiastical parishes
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Table 1: Summary Statistics per Occupation, London 1881
Industrial
All Professional Commercial Artisan Builder Food/Agri Services
Age 38.221 38.230 37.529 38.817 38.682 38.074 37.872
(10.40) (10.16) (10.31) (10.64) (10.35) (10.29) (10.37)
Married 0.959 0.910 0.961 0.964 0.971 0.954 0.962
(0.199) (0.287) (0.194) (0.187) (0.168) (0.210) (0.192)
# children 2.169 1.913 2.040 2.324 2.259 2.055 2.261
(2.050) (2.011) (1.979) (2.112) (2.066) (2.008) (2.072)
# servants 0.175 0.662 0.106 0.116 0.061 0.339 0.084
(0.813) (1.699) (0.711) (0.652) (0.384) (1.026) (0.455)
Residents
Parish birth 0.136 0.059 0.118 0.155 0.164 0.130 0.143
(0.343) (0.236) (0.322) (0.362) (0.370) (0.336) (0.350)
County birth 0.474 0.323 0.460 0.504 0.497 0.462 0.503
(0.499) (0.468) (0.498) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
Obs 128,709 8,371 27,563 30,542 22,065 22,687 17,481
Notes: Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis. Sample includes only native working-age
(between 15 and 60) male household heads living in BW/Vestry with at least two ecclesiastical
parishes, and living in parish which has a minimum of 30 residents.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Main Results
Following the decision model expressed in equations (2)-(3), each Londoner, taking social
group as given, chooses an occupation among professional, commercial or industrial jobs (i.e.
artisan, builder, food and agriculture, or services). We control for individual characteristics
xg,i which include age, sex, marital status, number of children, number of servants, and a
indicator for whether individuals lived in their parish of birth.19 Network–level covariates
wg,iXg include the same characteristics aggregated at the ecclesiastical parish level and
weighted by the geographic distance between individuals of the group (i.e. the strength of
ties).20
We present the NPL–Λ structural estimation in Table 2. Column 1 shows the results
19 Our focus is on the role of social contacts on the occupation choice of an individual.
We have considered the economic factors as given conditions which impose limits within
which these social influences can operate. We restrict our attention to London and includ-
ing BW/Vestry and parish fixed effects, we are controlling for very localized labor market
conditions such as local labor opportunities, working conditions, and schools. However, due
to the nature of historical data, human capital variables (such as training, educational qual-
ifications and spells of unemployment), wages and other factors believed to be important in
making an occupational choice cannot be measured directly and are therefore excluded from
consideration. We might thus be overestimating the effect of social contacts if these factors
are positively correlated to social contacts.
20 In our application, Assumption A.4 in Proposition 2 does not necessarily hold because
all exogenous variables have bounded support. Nevertheless, we observe that their support is
sufficiently bounded away from the unit interval for at least the following exogenous variables:
age, number of servants and number of children.
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from homogeneous rational expectations à la Brock and Durlauf (2006). That is, every
individual is linked to everyone else in the same parish, attaching equal weight to their
influence (wg,ij = 1/(ng− 1),∀j ∈ g \{i}). In column 2, we present our baseline results from
the heterogeneous rational expectations model. We define Wg as row-normalized matrix
with zeros on the diagonal and entry wg,ij = 1/#neig,i if j is a neighbor of i. We define
a neighbor as any two individuals living within a 50 meters radius from each other’s street
midpoint within the same parish (i.e., neig,i = {j ∈ g : j 6= i, dg,ij ≤ 50}) and #neig,i is the
number of neighbors i has. In both columns, we control for fixed effects at the BW/Vestry
level. Given the role of public good provider of BW/Vestry adding their fixed effect partly
deals with the issue of self–selection into groups. Under homogeneous rational expectations,
we find that peers within a social group have a positive influence on the occupation choice
regardless of the occupation type. However, the degree of influence varies depending on
the type of occupation. Peers exert more influence in industrial artisans, industrial builder,
and commercial occupations while they exert less influence in the case of industrial services,
industrial food/agriculture and professional occupations.21 Under heterogeneous rational
21 In the absence of postal codes, we located individuals based on parish of residence but we
cannot locate the exact house number. The point geo-referencing a street was located in the
middle of the street within the appropriate parish. This means that several individuals living
on the same street within the same parish were placed on the same point. This measurement
error however occurs only at the street level as individuals are correctly located to their parish
of residence. Conley and Topa (2003) discuss the potential implication of imperfect location
data on the identification of local interactions. When location information is correct up
to some spatial region (in our case ecclesiastical parish), this is equivalent to having only
aggregate-level information on the number of people with each outcome within that region.
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expectations, the influence of peers remains positive for all occupation types. We still observe
a large variation in the size of the endogenous effects depending on the type of occupation.
However these effects are now more precisely estimated. Therefore adding heterogeneity
through the weighting matrix based on geographic distances increases the precision of the
estimates.22
To further control for potential correlated effects at the group level, we add parish fixed-
effects in column 3.23 These correlated effects can take the form of local industries or an
inspiring priest encouraging his parishioners to work or share information. The effects are
smaller in magnitude and less significant. This points to the fact that ignoring possible
unobserved shocks at the group level might lead us to wrongly attribute effects to the in-
They show that in this case the local identification of the parameters is preserved. The
results of such specification is in in column 1 of Table 2.
22 The inclusion of the heterogeneous rational expectation is particularly appropriate in a
setting like ours where members have many peers within a network, reminiscent of a “small
world” setup (i.e. a non-sparse adjacency matrix). By “small world” we do not mean that
the number of nodes (i.e. number of agents) is small, rather that many of the nodes within
the same group are connected to each other. The level of connectedness is also important
for smaller communities where we might expect individuals to personally interact with each
other and therefore know the characteristics of their peers.
23 For this specification, we test for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
assumption in the multinomial logit specification (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). To do
so, we take the estimates from the last iteration of the NPL-Λ algorithm. As we have L = 6
different occupations, we perform the test by removing each occupation one at a time (apart
from the reference occupation which is set to be Professional) and estimating the last step
again. In none of the five Hausman-McFadden tests performed do we find evidence to reject
the null hypothesis of IIA.
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fluence of peers. We present the average marginal effects times the standard deviation of
the weighted estimated beliefs (AME) associated to the previous specification in column 4.24
A one standard deviation increase in the expected ratio of peers in a particular occupation
leads to an increase in the likelihood of being employed in the same occupation ranging
from 0.44% to 3.70% for professionals and industrial artisans respectively.25 One explana-
tion for the lower influence of peers in professional occupations is that the relevant social
contacts for job opportunity is likely to be at a higher level than the ecclesiastical parish. In
contrast, industrial artisans, builders and commercial occupations might benefit more from
local word-of-mouth social contacts. The use of informal contacts for job search has been
found to vary by location and occupation. Our results show that localized social interactions
can offer an explanation for differences in occupational choice and the spatial clustering in
occupations.26
24 With this scale, we can interpret our reported AME as the effect of a one standard
deviation increase in the expected ratio of peers in a particular occupation on the likelihood
of being employed in that same occupation. Notice that the standard AME effect simply
computes, given parameters θ, the empirical average of the individual change in the estimated
propensity to follow an occupation y ∈ Y , dp̂y,i, to a unit change in the expected share of
peers following that same occupation, dwip̂y ( ˜AMEy = Êi
[
dp̂y,i
dwip̂y
;θ
]
). We scale it by the
empirical standard deviation of the expected share of peers following that same occupation
(AMEy = Êi
[
dp̂y,i
dwip̂y
;θ
]
ŝdi [wip̂y;θ]).
25 Notice that the magnitudes found are in line with contemporary studies such as Bayer
et al. (2008) who find that two individuals residing on the same versus nearby blocks increase
the probability of working together by 0.8% to 3.6%.
26 In Appendix E.2, we explain and present the average marginal effects of the exogenous
effects. Among these exogenous variables, we find that the direct effect is significantly more
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important than the indirect ones. Age, the number of servants and being married have a
negative direct effect on individuals for any occupation category, while the number of children
and living in the parish of birth have a positive effect.
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Table 2: Estimation of endogenous effects, γy
NPL–Λ Expectations
Homogeneous Heterogeneous AME†
Occupation (y) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Professional 1.71 1.67∗∗ 1.14 0.44%
(2.84) (0.68) (0.77) [0.002]
Commercial 2.51∗ 1.96∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 2.54%
(1.43) (0.93) (0.79) [0.004]∗∗∗
Industrial Artisan 3.53∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗ 3.70%
(1.27) (0.33) (0.55) [0.004]∗∗∗
Industrial Builder 2.73 3.32∗∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗ 2.55%
(2.13) (0.61) (0.82) [0.004]∗∗∗
Industrial Food/Agriculture 0.73 2.29∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 2.42%
(2.46) (0.85) (0.63) [0.003]∗∗∗
Industrial Services 1.28 2.68∗ 1.39 0.73%
(3.53) (1.57) (2.66) [0.008]
log-like -214,890 -214,250 -212,110
AIC 430,210 428,940 426,190
Obs. 128,709
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Estimation of endogenous effects, γy
NPL–Λ Expectations
Homogeneous Heterogeneous AME†
Occupation (y) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes
Group characteristics yes yes yes yes
BW/Vestry fixed effects yes yes no no
Parish fixed effects νg,y no no yes yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at parish level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Table reports endogenous effects γy,∀y ∈ Y from equations (2)-(3) model, where
occupation choice set Y is professional, commercial, industrial artisan, industrial builder,
industrial in food and agriculture, or industrial in services. In column 1 every indiviual is
linked to everyone else in the same parish, attaching equal weight to their influence (wg,ij =
1
(ng−1)). In columns 2 and 3 neighbors are two individuals living within 50 meters with
elements of weighting matrix as wg,ij =
1
#neig,i
. Individual characteristics xi include age,
marital status, number of children, number of servants and resident in parish of birth. Group
characteristics are wg,iXg. NPL-Λ uses φ = 0.1.
† Column 4 presents the average marginal
effect times the standard deviation of the weighted estimated beliefs (AME). The standard
errors in square brackets follow Krinsky and Robb (1986)’s method using 1, 000 replications
(see Appendix E for details).
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4.3.2 Alternative Explanations
Our results show that social networks play a role in the choice of occupation of individuals.
There are however other possible mechanisms at play. First, the main threat to our identi-
fication is the sorting of individuals into neighborhoods and occupations. We mitigate this
problem in our baseline specification by including BW/Vestry fixed effects. We also include
parish fixed effects such that social effects are identified by variation within parishes. Nev-
ertheless, one might still worry about within parish-level sorting. Historical evidence points
to tight housing market and limited geographic mobility in Victorian London. During the
nineteenth century, London grew rapidly due to a high birth rate and migration to the city
from other parts of England. This led to severe pressure on the city’s housing with many of
the inner most districts having over half their population living in overcrowded conditions
by the 1880s (Inwood, 2011). There is a large amount of evidence given before the Royal
Commission on Means of Locomotion and Transport in London which suggests that there
was a large unsatisfied demand for housing in London (Habakkuk, 1962).
We also examine whether the decision to move away from the parish of birth and residing
on a particular street-parish in 1881 is correlated with the composition of occupations present
on that street-parish in 1851.27 In Table F.4 in the Appendix we see that the share of
individuals working in different occupation types in 1851 at the street of residence in 1881
do not influence the decision to move away from the parish of birth in 1881. Variables that
do matter are the average number of servants and the average share of residents that were
27 We first match parish and street addresses from the I-CeM 1851 census (see Appendix
B.3) to our baseline sample from the NAPP 1881 census. We then aggregate characteristics
of the population in 1851 at the street-parish level.
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born in that parish. This suggests that there is no sorting at the street-parish level based
on historical expertise.
We further dispel concerns about within-parish sorting in Table F.5. We first examine
whether there are differences in the endogenous effects by mobility status. We interact the
various occupation types with an indicator of whether the individual lives in his parish of
birth (i.e. non-movers, in column 2). We do not see an additional effect for non-movers,
except for the industrial service occupations. We also implement two placebo tests. In the
first one, we randomly allocate individuals to different streets within the same parish. The
“placebo neigbhors” consists of parish members who have been allocated to a street within a
50 meter radius of an individual but who in reality may live further away. We do so 100 times
and estimate our structural parameters for each new allocation (column 3). In the second
one, we define an individual’s neighbors as parish members who are more distant than the
50 meter threshold (column 4). In the first placebo, the endogenous effects are all smaller
in magnitude than the benchmark. In the second one, they are statistically different to the
benchmark. With the exception of one occupation, all others are not significantly different
than zero. Given the difference in the identity of neighbors, it is not surprising that we cannot
recover our baseline results with these placebos. This reveals the importance of correctly
identifying neighbors and their the geographic location within a parish. Specifically, the
geographic proximity between individuals is a sensible proxy for the likelihood and frequency
of their encounters and consequently the influence they have on one another.
Second, Victorian Britain has been depicted as an unequal and immobile society. Family
background has been found to exert greater influence on economic status than was previously
believed (Solon et al., 1991). If individuals inherited their occupations from their family and
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simultaneously chose to live close to their parents, we might be attributing occupational
choice to social network instead of family. To control for the role of family, we identify the
occupation of fathers and brothers in our sample and control for their potential influence
in the occupational choice. We use the 100% 1851 and 1881 datasets from I-CeM Project
(Schürer and Higgs, 2020) and link individuals using a novel linking method (Abramitzky
et al., 2020) (see Appendix C for details on the linking procedure).28 This allows us to track
individuals between the 1851 and 1881 censuses. We are thus able to identify the father as
the head of household in 1851 and the son as the head of household himself in 1881. We
identify also their brothers living in the same household in 1851 and track them in the 1881
census. Table F.6 in the Appendix compares the fathers’ occupations observed in 1851 and
sons’ occupations observed in 1881. To take into account the age of occupational choice, the
sample is based on sons aged 13-19 in 1851 when their father’s occupation is observed. The
occupations of sons are observed in 1881. We see that 63% of sons ended up in occupations
different from those of their fathers. This confirms the conclusion reached by Long (2013)
that the intergenerational mobility was larger than previously believed.
In Table F.7 in the Appendix we control for family effects in two ways. At the last step
of our recursive baseline estimation, we first control for the father’s occupation for sample
of linked individuals whose father’s occupation is known. Comparing columns 1 and 2, we
see that controlling for the father’s occupation does not change the sign, magnitude nor
significance of the endogenous effects. We then control for the brother’s occupation for the
28 Our main results are based on the NAPP 1881 census. Since starting the project, the
NAPP no longer provides the names and addresses of individuals. We therefore cannot rely
on the I-CeM project for the linking of the 1851 to 1881 censuses.
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sample of linked individuals who have brothers with known occupation. Again, comparing
columns 3 and 4, the coefficients of the endogenous effects are very similar with and without
the brother’s occupation as a control. These results suggest that social contact play a
significant role even after controlling for the role of family members.
4.3.3 Robustness Checks
We perform a number of robustness checks. First, we explore the sensitivity of our results to
different specifications of the weighting matrix as in Lin (2010). In column 2 of Table G.8 in
the Appendix, neighbors are defined as individuals living on the same street.29 Results are
very similar to our main specification in column 1, where neighbors are living 50 meters from
one another in the same parish. In column 3 weights are created based on the continuous
distance between parish members. We use the row-normalized exponential distance weights
which takes the form wg,ij =
exp(−αdg,ij)∑
j′∈g\{i}
exp(−αdg,ij′ )
, ∀j ∈ g \ {i} where α is any positive exponent
(we set it equal to 1). Closer parish members exert more influence than members who live
further away. This reflects the probability or frequency of meeting and hence the strength
of ties. Again, the endogenous effects are robust to this alternative measure of tie strength.
Second, in the baseline specification, working-age men form rational expectations about
the occupational choice of all other working-age men within their parish. The age of individ-
uals and their peers are included as control characteristics. However older and experienced
workers have already chosen their occupation and will no longer form expectations. We
29 Notice that our parameters are identified provided that, within a parish, streets have
different numbers of residents, thus guaranteeing that the rows of the weighting matrix differ
for two residents living on different streets.
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therefore restrict our sample to younger individuals who form beliefs on the occupational
choice of other parish members from their cohort or younger, and use the actual occupation
choice of parish members older than them. This allows us to include all parish members
in the interaction matrix even though we restrict the sample to younger individuals. Table
G.9 presents the baseline in column 1, restricts the sample to men between 15 and 30 years
old in column 2, and restricts the sample to men between 15 and 45 years old in column 3.
As we restrict to younger individuals, the endogenous coefficients are larger in magnitude
(except for industrial food/agriculture) and significant at smaller levels than in the baseline
specification. This can be explained by the fact that we are only partly capturing the social
group of older cohorts as individuals may have moved or passed away.
Third, as stated in proposition 1, multiple equilibria could arise whenever endogenous
effects are larger than 3.33 in absolute value. We investigate whether there are multiple
equilibria in two different exercises using first our estimated parameters for γ and then these
estimated parameters but adding one time the standard error. None of the 186 parishes
included in our study have more than one equilibrium in both exercises.30
Finally, to remove the first-order bias term in our NPL-Λ estimates stemming from the
incidental parameter bias, we define a split-panel jackknife estimation procedure based on
unbalanced panel data models (see Appendix I). Taken together, the results suggest that if
any, the incidental parameters bias is not acute in our application.
30 We implemented a spectral method and results are available upon request. We use 1,000
randomly generated starting values where all subjects follow each occupation with strictly
positive probability. In addition, we set 6 “extreme” starting values, where every parish
member follows each occupation with certainty.
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates how peers within a social group influence the occupational choice of
individuals in Victorian London. We propose a multinomial choice model with social inter-
actions and asymmetric influences, thereby extending prior work on binary choice models
with asymmetric influences (Lee et al., 2014) and multinomial choice models with symmetric
influences (Brock and Durlauf, 2006). The model allows for correlated effects at the group
level and includes a spatial weighting matrix to capture the strength of social ties. We
establish the identification of the endogenous and exogenous effects when there is enough
variation in the weighting matrix and provide a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium.
We construct a new dataset which geographically locates London residents enumerated
in the full census of 1881. The boundaries of ecclesiastical parishes are used as a proxy
for social groups while the strength of the ties between parish members is measured by
their geographical distance. To circumvent the self-selection into social group problems,
we use fixed–effects at the administrative and social group level. The Relaxation Method
Nested Pseudo Likelihood algorithm proposed by Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) is applied
to provide consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the structural parameters.
Our results indicate that social interactions within parishes played an important role in
determining occupational choices. We find robust empirical evidence that an increase in the
share of peers within a parish employed in a particular occupation led to a significant increase
an individual’s probability of being employed at that same occupation. The magnitude of
the effects ranges from 0.44% to 3.70% depending on the type of occupation. Individuals
working as industrial artisans are the most influenced by the peers within their social groups
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while individuals in professional occupations are the least influenced.
While our results rely on historical data, our setup might offer a more credible definition
of social network than contemporary studies. In the modern world of easy mobility and
technological information, geographical–based measures may not adequately capture social
networks. In contrast, communities in the nineteenth century were arguable more local
in nature. Moreover, the religious feature of our social group definition offers a plausible
additional dimension given that church attendance remained mandatory. More generally, the
empirical model may be applied to many areas involving local interactions and categorical
outcomes. We show that failing to account for asymmetric influence may bias the endogenous
effect on occupational choices.
These findings contribute to our understanding of spatial clustering in occupation and
inequality patterns within a city (Bayer et al., 2008; Glaeser et al., 2009). It also provides a
novel interpretation for high intergenerational persistence of segregation by occupation that
has been documented by Borjas (1994) if individuals use their inherited social connections
to find jobs.
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